Τί οὖν; νῦν οὐ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἡμῖν φαίνεται ἐργαζομένη, ἡγεμονεύουσά τε ἐκείνων πάντων ἐξ ὧν φησί τις αὐτὴν εἶναι, καὶ ἐναντιουμένη ὀλίγου πάντα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου καὶ δεσπόζουσα πάντας τρόπους, τὰ μὲν χαλεπώτερον κολάζουσα καὶ μετ’ ἀλγηδόνων, τά τε κατὰ τὴν γυμναστικὴν καὶ τὴν ἰατρικήν, τὰ δὲ πρᾳότερον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀπειλοῦσα, τὰ δὲ νουθετοῦσα, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὀργαῖς καὶ φόβοις ὡς ἄλλη οὖσα ἄλλῳ πράγματι διαλεγομένη; οἷόν που καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐν Ὀδυσσείᾳ πεποίηκεν, οὗ λέγει τὸν Ὀδυσσέα· στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ· (Phaedo, 94c9-d7)
April 30, 2006
November 27, 2005
Metaphysics Z.17
My observations. Question #1. Regarding 1041a27-32, where Aristotle proposes to explore the question “what is x” from a new angle “why is x y.” From this, i.e., a why-question asks why one thing belongs to another, Aristotle infers that “what is sought is the cause.” The text then adds “and this is, to speak logically, the essence” (touto d’ esti to ti en einai, hos eipein logikos) (1041a28). Jaeger brackets the sentence and explains “verba ut spuria del. Al.” (i.e. Alexander deletes the words as spurious).
November 20, 2005
Metaphysics Z.14-16
My observations. In Zeta 16 Aristotle argues that (a) a substance must be one (1040b5-16) and (b) yet one cannot be the substance of a thing (1040b16-27). Here I have four sets of questions/observations:
(1) the association of potentiality and matter (1040b5-8),
(2) the problem of the unity of natural kinds/elemental stuff (1040b8-10),
(3) the relation of unity and being (1040b16-27), and
(4) Aristotle's criticism on the one over many (1040b27-1041a3).
(1) the association of potentiality and matter (1040b5-8),
(2) the problem of the unity of natural kinds/elemental stuff (1040b8-10),
(3) the relation of unity and being (1040b16-27), and
(4) Aristotle's criticism on the one over many (1040b27-1041a3).
Metaphysics Z.14-16
Study Notes of Metaphysics Z14-16. Z14: The Platonic conception of forms was associated with the claim that universals are substances.
(1) If “animal” is supposed the same in horse and in man, (a) how can it be the same in things that exist apart? (b) If it shares in “two-footed” and in “many-footed,” it will have contrary attributes; if it does not, in what sense can it be two-footed?
(2) If “animal” is different in each species, (a) there will be practically an infinity of things whose substance is “animal.” (b) Each of several things will be “animal itself.” (c) From what will the “animal” in each species be derived?
(3) These and even greater difficulties arise if we consider the relation of Forms to sensible things.
(1) If “animal” is supposed the same in horse and in man, (a) how can it be the same in things that exist apart? (b) If it shares in “two-footed” and in “many-footed,” it will have contrary attributes; if it does not, in what sense can it be two-footed?
(2) If “animal” is different in each species, (a) there will be practically an infinity of things whose substance is “animal.” (b) Each of several things will be “animal itself.” (c) From what will the “animal” in each species be derived?
(3) These and even greater difficulties arise if we consider the relation of Forms to sensible things.
November 14, 2005
Metaphysics Z.13
Study Notes. How are we to reconcile the claim that no universal is substance and the claim that an essence is a substance? For surely essences are universals?
(a) If forms are to be understood in the usual way, i.e. as universals, then in order to maintain their claim to be substances we must apparently say that Z13 does not really mean to argue that no universal is a substance. But this interpretation conflicts with what our text actually says, such as “nothing predicated universally is a substance…”
(b) An Alternative version of this line of interpretation holds that Aristotle is attaching an unexpected sense to the word “universal”. The idea is that he still conceives of essences as in our sense universal, but they are no longer to be counted as universal in his sense, for in his sense, “universal” now means “more universal than is the indivisible species-form”. One objection can be noted: This interpretation certainly posits a change in Aristotle’s use of the word “universal”. Yet Aristotle does not appear to intend any such change.
2. Bostock’s conjecture: there was an earlier version of Z13 in which the species-form was counted as a substance, and a later version in which it was not. The crucial part of the conjecture is that (2) part of the earlier version and was not intended to be part of the later version at all, whereas the later version contained (1), (3), (4), (5).
(a) Earlier version: so long as the universal species-form is still allowed as a substance, the claim that anything more universal than this is not a substance fits well enough with Aristotle’s doctrine elsewhere.
(b) Whether this version is taken as implying that only particular men, horses, trees, and so on, could be substances, or whether it is taken as implying that only their particular forms could be substances, in either case it is clearly not consistent with the main thrust of Z4-11. It is also contradicted by the opening o fZ15, which implies that both universal forms and concrete particulars are substances.
But why should Aristotle have wished to destroy his earlier discussion in this way? Had he come to believe in particular forms? Could it…?
(a) If forms are to be understood in the usual way, i.e. as universals, then in order to maintain their claim to be substances we must apparently say that Z13 does not really mean to argue that no universal is a substance. But this interpretation conflicts with what our text actually says, such as “nothing predicated universally is a substance…”
(b) An Alternative version of this line of interpretation holds that Aristotle is attaching an unexpected sense to the word “universal”. The idea is that he still conceives of essences as in our sense universal, but they are no longer to be counted as universal in his sense, for in his sense, “universal” now means “more universal than is the indivisible species-form”. One objection can be noted: This interpretation certainly posits a change in Aristotle’s use of the word “universal”. Yet Aristotle does not appear to intend any such change.
2. Bostock’s conjecture: there was an earlier version of Z13 in which the species-form was counted as a substance, and a later version in which it was not. The crucial part of the conjecture is that (2) part of the earlier version and was not intended to be part of the later version at all, whereas the later version contained (1), (3), (4), (5).
(a) Earlier version: so long as the universal species-form is still allowed as a substance, the claim that anything more universal than this is not a substance fits well enough with Aristotle’s doctrine elsewhere.
(b) Whether this version is taken as implying that only particular men, horses, trees, and so on, could be substances, or whether it is taken as implying that only their particular forms could be substances, in either case it is clearly not consistent with the main thrust of Z4-11. It is also contradicted by the opening o fZ15, which implies that both universal forms and concrete particulars are substances.
But why should Aristotle have wished to destroy his earlier discussion in this way? Had he come to believe in particular forms? Could it…?
November 6, 2005
Metaphysics Z.10-12
My observations. 1. What exactly is the problem of the unity of a definition? (1037b8-14)
Ross: "what constitutes the unity of a subject of a definition?"
Bostock: "what is it that holds these parts together, so as to make them parts of some one thing?"
Burnyeat: "Why is two-footed animal one thing, not many?"
Marc Cohen: "Definitions are complex (a definition is always some combination of terms), so what accounts for the definiendum being one thing, rather then many?
Ross: "what constitutes the unity of a subject of a definition?"
Bostock: "what is it that holds these parts together, so as to make them parts of some one thing?"
Burnyeat: "Why is two-footed animal one thing, not many?"
Marc Cohen: "Definitions are complex (a definition is always some combination of terms), so what accounts for the definiendum being one thing, rather then many?
Metaphysics Z.10-12
Study Notes of Ross, Burnyeat, Bostock. Ross: Zeta 10: (1) Should the definition of a whole contain the definition of the parts? (2) What parts are prior to the whole?
Question: “Prior” in what sense?
The wholes are prior to the parts both in definition and in power of independent existence.
Question: “Prior” in what sense?
The wholes are prior to the parts both in definition and in power of independent existence.
October 23, 2005
Metaphysics Z.7-9
My observations. 1. How is an artistic production, such as a healthy person, produced? How does an unhealthy person become healthy?
In Zeta 7 Aristotle mentions that the artistic production presupposes the presence of the form of the product in the soul of the artist. But in the case of becoming healthy person, unlike the production of a house (Zeta 9), needs not an external mover. So it seems that the person who undergoes the becoming from unhealthy to healthy is the artist, where resides the presence of the form of health. (1032b4-11) Yet Ross construes the artist as the physician. According to Zeta 7, health is produced (a) by thinking of the conditions of health and (b) when the thought is complete, the making (i.e. the process toward health) begins. So, does it mean that the unhealthy person himself can become healthy simply by thinking of the conditions of health? Simply thinking of the conditions of health can trigger off the becoming of a healthy person?
In Zeta 7 Aristotle mentions that the artistic production presupposes the presence of the form of the product in the soul of the artist. But in the case of becoming healthy person, unlike the production of a house (Zeta 9), needs not an external mover. So it seems that the person who undergoes the becoming from unhealthy to healthy is the artist, where resides the presence of the form of health. (1032b4-11) Yet Ross construes the artist as the physician. According to Zeta 7, health is produced (a) by thinking of the conditions of health and (b) when the thought is complete, the making (i.e. the process toward health) begins. So, does it mean that the unhealthy person himself can become healthy simply by thinking of the conditions of health? Simply thinking of the conditions of health can trigger off the becoming of a healthy person?
Metaphysics Z.7-9
Study Notes of Ross’ commentaries. Z7: How is a natural thing, such as a man, produced?
Natural becoming: the “from which” is matter, which is capable both of being or not being.
How is an artistic production, such as a healthy man, produced?
Artistic becoming: the artistic production presupposes the presence of the form of the product in the soul of the artist. Health is produced (a) by thinking of the conditions of health and (b) when the thought is complete, the making (i.e. the process toward health) begins. The genesis has two stages, thinking and making.
Natural becoming: the “from which” is matter, which is capable both of being or not being.
How is an artistic production, such as a healthy man, produced?
Artistic becoming: the artistic production presupposes the presence of the form of the product in the soul of the artist. Health is produced (a) by thinking of the conditions of health and (b) when the thought is complete, the making (i.e. the process toward health) begins. The genesis has two stages, thinking and making.
October 10, 2005
Metaphysics Z.6
My observations. 1031a15-18
(1) Each thing = its substance
(2) Each substance = its essence
(3) Therefore, each thing = its essence
Here are my four questions for Zeta 6:
#1 about the reduction ad absurdum argument at 1031a21-28
#2 about the identity of substance with essence at 1031b3-6 and 1031b33-1032a3
#3 about the forms (eide) at 1031b14-15
#4 about the question whether Socrates and to be Socrates are the same thing at 1032a4-11
(1) Each thing = its substance
(2) Each substance = its essence
(3) Therefore, each thing = its essence
Here are my four questions for Zeta 6:
#1 about the reduction ad absurdum argument at 1031a21-28
#2 about the identity of substance with essence at 1031b3-6 and 1031b33-1032a3
#3 about the forms (eide) at 1031b14-15
#4 about the question whether Socrates and to be Socrates are the same thing at 1032a4-11