My observations. 1031a15-18
(1) Each thing = its substance
(2) Each substance = its essence
(3) Therefore, each thing = its essence
Here are my four questions for Zeta 6:
#1 about the reduction ad absurdum argument at 1031a21-28
#2 about the identity of substance with essence at 1031b3-6 and 1031b33-1032a3
#3 about the forms (eide) at 1031b14-15
#4 about the question whether Socrates and to be Socrates are the same thing at 1032a4-11
Question #1
About the reduction ad absurdum argument at 1031a21-28, (a) what does Aristotle mean by “to leukoi einai” and “to mousikoi einai”? The attributes pale and musical? Or the thing that has the attribute? (b) How should we construe the relation of the two possible objections at 1031a24-28?
Reductio ad absurdum (31a21-24)
(1) A pale man = being for a pale man
(2) A pale man = a man (as they say)
(3) A man = being for a man
(4) Being for a pale man = being for a man
(5) But (4) is evidently false, so (1) must be rejected.
If premise (2) is to be acceptable, then it must be taken to concern some particular pale man. And the argument is valid only if it is that same man who is in premise (1) and (3). So we may call premise (2) “coincidental identity” (Topics 103a33-39)
1031a24-28
Ross’ translation: “but perhaps it does not follow that the essence of accidental unities should be the same as that of the simple terms. For the simple terms are not in the same way identical with the middle term. (31a24-25) But perhaps this might be thought to follow, that the extreme terms, the accidents, should turn out to be the same, e.g. the essence of white and that of musical; but this is not actually thought to be the case. (31a25-28)”
Bostock’ translation: “or is there no necessity that things that are coincidentally [the same] should be the same? For not it is not in this same way [namely, coincidentally] that the extreme terms become the same. (31a24-25) However, it would perhaps seem to follow that the extreme terms would be the same coincidentally, e.g. being for a pale thing and being for an artistic thing. But this seems not to be the case. (31a25-28)”
Ross’ interpretation of 31a23-28: perhaps premise (2) does not follow from premise (1), but it might however seem at least to follow that the accidental extremes (e.g. essence of white and essence of musical) are the same; but they are not. (Ross, II, 175)
Bostock takes 31a24-25 as an objection to the validity of premise (2), which suggests that a mere coincidental identity should not really be counted as a case of sameness at all. (Bostock, 105)
Ross, as Bostock conceives, takes 31a25-28 as Aristotle’s reply to this objection by saying that we could avoid this objection if we rewrote the argument with “a pale thing” in place of “a pale man,” and “an artist thing” in place of “a man.” (106)
And, Bostock takes 31a25-28 as Aristotle’s reply to this objection by saying that it would follow from the argument that the extreme terms must be coincidentally the same. Therefore, we are still entitled to reject premise (1).
Bostock “I can only say that this reading [i.e. Ross’] of a24-5 seems even more far-fetched than mine…” (106)
My comments:
(a) There is an interesting switch: Ross construes “to leukoi einai” as “essence of white” and “to mousikoi einai” as “essence of musical,” whereas Bostock construes it as “the thing that has the attribute white” and “the thing that has the attribute musical” respectively.
(b) It seems to me that Aristotle is aware of two possible objections to his reduction ad absurdum argument: one on premise (2); the other on premise (4). For, it seems that if we can either reject premise (2) or justify premise (4), then we can restore the force of Aristotle’s reduction ad absurdum. So it seems to me that Aristotle’s argument goes like this: At 31a24-25 Aristotle is aware that the objection to premise (2) might be sustained due to its “coincidental identity”, so he proceeds to say that, even if premise (2) may not justifiably follow from premise (1), premise (4) still cannot justifiably follow, because it is also a coincidental identity.
Question #2
About the identity of substance with essence at 1031b3-6 and 1031b33-1032a3, would the relation of “having” each other or “having” the same formula still lead to an infinite regress?
It seems to me that Aristotle provides two descriptions of what he means by the identity of substance with essence: one at 1031b3-6; the other at 1031b33-1032a3. Yet both of them are related to “having” something.
(1) The passage at 1031b3-6 states that substance is the same as essence if and only if they belong to each other (i.e. substance belongs to essence and essence belongs to substance).
(2) The passage at 1021b33-1032a3 says that substance is the same as essence because they have the same formula (or definition).
Question #3
About the forms (eide) at 1031b14-15, are they (a) Platonic Forms, (b) species, or (c) Aristotelian forms?
Burnyeat rules out the choice (a) for the reason that (i) Aristotle has consistently used “idea” for “Platonic Form” and (ii) 1031b14-15 seems to say something positive about eide: primary things are identical with their essence even if they are not eide. So this olds all the more so if they are eide. And, Burnyeat rules out the choice (b) for the reason that this would keep Z6 on the same level as Z4. So Burnyeat goes by the choice (c). (Burnyeat, 27-28)
Bostock (as well as Burnyeat) holds that the passage at 1031a28-b11 is about Platonic Forms for the reason that “Aristotle concludes that goodness and the essence of a good thing are the same, here dropping the title ‘goodness-itself,’ which indicates that it is a Platonic form that is under discussion.” (Bostock, 110) Bostock does not directly answer the question Burnyeat proposes. But he holds that what follows at 1031b15-18 is directed against the Platonic Forms: not because (i) Platonic forms would be substances that do not underlie, but because (ii) Platonic forms would be substance whose existence did not depend upon something underlying them. So it seems that Bostock goes by the choice (a) at 1031a14-15?
My question is: how do Aristotelian forms differ from Platonic forms? Is it that Aristotelian forms depend on something underlying them and thus are not primary and not in their own right?
Question #4
About the question whether Socrates and to be Socrates are the same thing at 1032a4-11, does Aristotle explain this puzzle or his preferred solution to it?
From the perspective of the Categories, Socrates is called a primary substance and should be counted as “spoken of in his own right” and indeed as “primary” in the sense of Z4, 1030a10-11, and thus Socrates must count as being identical with his essence. But on the other hand, from the perspective of Metaphysics Socrates is regarded as a compound of form in matter and cannot possibly be identical with his essence of a man.
Burnyeat says Aristotle did not explain his preferred solution. (28)
Bostock says that Aristotle intended his correct conclusion as “any universal and definable characteristic is identical with what is given in its definition, and hence with its essence; nothing else is.” (117) Yet this conclusion may be too optimistic…
