My observations. 1. How is an artistic production, such as a healthy person, produced? How does an unhealthy person become healthy?
In Zeta 7 Aristotle mentions that the artistic production presupposes the presence of the form of the product in the soul of the artist. But in the case of becoming healthy person, unlike the production of a house (Zeta 9), needs not an external mover. So it seems that the person who undergoes the becoming from unhealthy to healthy is the artist, where resides the presence of the form of health. (1032b4-11) Yet Ross construes the artist as the physician. According to Zeta 7, health is produced (a) by thinking of the conditions of health and (b) when the thought is complete, the making (i.e. the process toward health) begins. So, does it mean that the unhealthy person himself can become healthy simply by thinking of the conditions of health? Simply thinking of the conditions of health can trigger off the becoming of a healthy person?
2. How is the natural becoming different from the other two becomings?
In Zeta 7 Aristotle seems to talk about three different kinds of becoming: (a) man begets man (aka natural becoming), (b) an unhealthy person becomes healthy (aka artistic production), and (c) the heat becomes from a healthy person (aka spontaneous production). For (a), the "from which" is matter, which is described as capable of being or not being. But for (b) and (c) the "from which" is not the substratum but the privation of the form health or warmth, since becoming healthy, for instance, does not come from the persistent substratum, i.e. person, but from the absence of health. So it seems that we have only two kinds of becoming if we look at the "from which." On the other hand, Aristotle seems to hold that all becomings presuppose both a privation and a substratum. Now, is there any unchanging and persistent thing (we cannot call it substratum, because the "from which" in the case of the natural becoming is matter) undergoing the natural becoming, e.g. man begets man? The only thing I can imagine is the form of human beings. So now we have an absurd contrast: what undergoes the other two becomings is the substratum, i.e. the matter or the composite, whereas what undergoes the natural becoming is the form?
3. Observation on the substratum as "matter"
It seems to me that in many places of Zeta 7-9, Aristotle associates the substratum with "matter." In Zeta 8 (33b19-34a8), while Aristotle argues that form does not come to be because form is a "such" not a "this," it is said that a "this such" is made out of a "this." A "this" looks initially like a composite, but later, it is said that the individual is "such a form in this matter," where matter is what differentiates individuals identical in forms."
Also, in the beginning of Zeta 9, while Aristotle answers why some things (e.g. health) are produced spontaneously as well as by art, and others not (e.g. a house)? The reason is said to be found in the "matter" involved. The matter of former is capable of being moved by itself, whereas the latter requires an external mover. In the beginning of Zeta 7, it is also said that the "from which," i.e. matter, is capable both of being and not being. It strikes me that Aristotle seems to endorse a rather active power to the matter!
