My observations. Question #1. Regarding 1041a27-32, where Aristotle proposes to explore the question “what is x” from a new angle “why is x y.” From this, i.e., a why-question asks why one thing belongs to another, Aristotle infers that “what is sought is the cause.” The text then adds “and this is, to speak logically, the essence” (touto d’ esti to ti en einai, hos eipein logikos) (1041a28). Jaeger brackets the sentence and explains “verba ut spuria del. Al.” (i.e. Alexander deletes the words as spurious).
Burnyeat is sympathetic to Ross’, Frede & Patzig’s reconstruction. According to Burnyeat, “what Pseudo-Alexander actually says (in Met. 540.38-541.1) is that the sentence is redundant, a premature anticipation of a point to be made later; so it must have been inserted by someone. By later he appears to mean 1041b7, where much the same question (“why are these things a house?) recurs and so, unsurprisingly, the same answer is given. Ross and Fred-Patzig are rightly unimpressed by Pseudo-Alexander’s reasoning and print the sentence… ‘But is not the final cause (and likewise the efficient cause) of a house frequently identified with its form?’ Yes, but we must respect Aristotle’s decision not to name it so here. ‘To speak logically’ is precisely not to speak in terms of form and matter.” (Burnyeat, 58)
Bostock is in favor of Alexander’s construal. According to Bostock, “Alexander proposed that these words be deleted, for they apparently say that every cause is a cause-as-essence, which does not appear to be correct Aristotelian doctrine. Jaeger’s text follows Alexander. Ross, however, defends the words, claiming that Aristotle did really mean to say that every cause is a cause-as-essence. Frede & Patzig follow Ross.” (Bostock, 239) And it seems “quite probable that Aristotle might really be meaning to claim that the final cause and the efficient cause are always at least a part of the essence.” (240)
Yet Bostock makes a further move and asks (where I (as well as Burnyeat would) think Bostock gets wrong), “What of the material cause?” (240) “Aristotle’s answer might be that in Physics II, 1, he has already claim that the matter and the form of a natural object must between them constitute its ‘nature’ and that this ‘nature’ will be the cause of all its natural behavior. So this perhaps is the kind of why-question that he thinks relevant: it is one that asks why objects of a certain kind naturally behave in a certain way. For example, if one asks why a tree falls in air but floats on water, the answer will be that it has ‘matter’ of a certain kind…” (240)
Bostock proceeds to argue that Ross is wrong at construing “all” causes to be formal causes. Bostock offers his interpretation of how Aristotle moves from the claim that substance is a cause “of some sort” (1041a9-10) to the claim that substance is in particular a cause as “form” (1041b7-9). One of Bostock’s reasons that we should reject Ross’ interpretation is that the material cause may be difficult to be seen as part of the formal causes. (240-241)
Now, here are my observations and comments:
(A) I am sympathetic to Bostock’s interpretation that Aristotle is probably not wishing to maintain that every cause is cause-as-essence. Yet, on the other hand, I don’t think the text shows (touto d’ esti to ti en einai, hos eipein logikos (1041a28)) a statement as strong as Bostock understands: every cause is cause-as-essence. (Nor does what Ross proposes imply a statement as strong as Bostock construes). Instead, it seems to me, what Aristotle wishes to maintain is that “every formal cause” is a cause-as-essence.
I have a different way of reconstructing the argument in 1041a6-32: (a) the reason that drives us to limit the sense of “cause” here is that in 1041a9-10 Aristotle explicitly points out that substance has to be understood a cause of “of some sort,” which is meant to be a “formal cause.” (b) Aristotle proceeds to the next paragraph 1041a10-27 and limits the why-question to be the question “why is x y?” and aims to find the “formal cause” to explain what makes x y. (c) And then in the third paragraph 1041a27-32 Aristotle goes on and argues that all this kind of causes, namely, “formal causes,” are causes-as-essences.
(B) One of the reasons to refute Ross’ interpretation, according to Bostock, is that the material cause may be difficult to be seen as part of formal cause. Yet it seems to me that Bostock’s suspicion is unnecessary, for a couple of reasons: (a) so far we are still in the stage of talking about the “forma cause,” if I am right at reconstructing Aristotle’s argument in 1041a6-32, and the issue of material cause will not come up until the next paragraph starting from 1041a32; (b) Burnyeat also construes the argument so far as “logical stage” and suggests that the “metaphysical subsection” begins from the next paragraph. “‘To speak logically’ is precisely not to speak in terms of form and matter.” (Burnyeat, 58); (c) Although in the Physics the “nature” of a thing is identified with its substance, i.e. its essence (193a9-11), the “nature” of a thing should not be right away conflated with its “material cause.”
Question #2
Aristotle proposes to explore the question “what is x” from a new angle “why is x y?” But how is the what-question “what is x” related to the why-question “why is x y” (1041a10-27 & 1041a32-b28)?
De dicto vs. de re: Bostock seems to me right at construing the why-question “why is x y” as a de re question, rather than a de dicto question. (a) A de dicto question: “why is it the case that all artistic men are artistic men?” or possibly, “why is it the case that this artistic man is this artistic man?” In either case, this is to ask for an explanation of a tautology (either of the form “all F are F” or of the form “x=x”). (b) A de re question: “of an artistic man, why he is an artistic man?” or “Why is that individual an artistic man?” (238-239)
Yet, how can the what-question “what is x” legitimately be construed as the why-question “why is x y?”
Bostcok: “one premise to the reasoning is that substance is a cause of some sort, i.e. an answer to some why-question. The other premise, which I now supply, is that substance is the answer to a what-is-x question… Putting these two premises together, we infer that the answer to a what-is-x question must also be the answer to a why-question, and hence that a what-is-x question must be a why-question… So we must now ask what why-question it is that is the same question as ‘what is a man?’, and I suggest that Aristotle’s first thought now is that it is the question ‘why is a man a man?’… Aristotle is drawn (subconsciously) by the de re interpretation of what is being asked: it does seem to make sense to ask, of some man, why he is a man; at any rate, this does not ask for the explanation of a tautology. So he envisages someone asking: ‘why is that man a man?’—or better, to avoid even the appearance of a tautology, ‘why is that thing a man?’… The words ‘that thing’ must refer not to a man but to something else…the matter of the man…” (243-244)
Burnyeat: “the metaphysical subsection begins at 1041a32. So far, Aristotle has been emphasizing that fruitful causal inquiry presupposes a question with the non-tautological predicative structure ‘why is x y?’ Then one can answer ‘because of z’, where z is the ‘middle term’ (see Posterior Analysis II 8) that links y to x. However, this presupposition appears to fail (1041a32: lanthanei) when you ask for the essence that makes a human being a human being. At first sight that looks like the unfruitful, tautological form of question, ‘why is x x?’… As usual, the form-matter analysis comes to the rescue. Human can be ‘articulated’, on the model of house. To ‘why are these materials a house?’ corresponds ‘why is this body in this condition a human?’ … We can fruitfully seek the cause of the matter’s being a so-and-so…” (59)
Both Bostock and Burnyeat seem to construe the why-question “why is x y?” to be “why is this matter to be such-and-such?” Indeed, Aristotle does explicitly mention that “it is clear that the question must be why the matter is so-and-so” (1041b4-5) Perhaps we’d better formulate the why-question as “why is y x?” if x is meant to refer to such-and-such and y to the matter.
Now,
(a) I simply find an interesting switch from 41a10-27 to 41b32ff. In 1041a10-27 the why-question still remains at “why does ‘this individual/composite’ belong to so-and-so?”, but when we get to 1041a32ff the why-question is switched to “why does ‘this matter’ belong to so-and-so?”
(b) I am still not very clear about how Aristotle moves from the what-question “what is x?” to the why-question “why is y x?” How can the what-question “what is x” legitimately be construed as the why-question “why is x y?”
