Study Notes of Ross, Burnyeat, Bostock. Ross: Zeta 10: (1) Should the definition of a whole contain the definition of the parts? (2) What parts are prior to the whole?
Question: “Prior” in what sense?
The wholes are prior to the parts both in definition and in power of independent existence.
The parts of substance are matter and form, but in a sense only the elements of the form are parts of the thing. The circle differs from the syllable, because the letters are parts of the form of the syllable, whereas the segments of the circle are matter.
The parts into which a whole is dissolved may be parts of the concrete whole but not of the form, and therefore cannot be counted as the parts of definition. For, things which are taken together with matter can be dissolved into their material parts, but things which are taken together without matter cannot be dissolved.
Thus those parts that are material, and into which the thing is divided as into its matter, are posterior; but those that are parts of the formula, and of the substance given by the formula, are prior. The soul in animals is the substance given by the formula, i.e. the form and what being is for bodies of this sort, and thus prior to the animal as the composite.
Universal composites like man and horse, which are predicated of particulars, are not substances but combined wholes of a certain kind, namely combined of such-and-such a formula in such-and-such matter taken as universal. (1035b27-29)
Return to question (1). There are parts of the form, parts of the concrete thing, and parts of the matter. Only parts of the form are parts of the definition. For, the concrete individual is not definable, but knowable by the aid of perception and intuition. Nor the matter is in itself knowable.
Return to question (2) whether the right angle, the circle, the animal, or their parts are prior.
Parts of the definition of “circle” the circularity (if the circle means the circularity) parts of a particular circle
Parts of the definition of “soul” the soul (if the animal means the soul) parts of a particular animal
Question related to 1035b24-29: we have been talking about the particular composites, but how about the universal composites, like man and horse? Are they posterior to their parts, i.e. forms of which they are consisted? Or they are priori to those parts?
Zeta 11
Zeta 12
What constitutes the unity of a subject of definition?
37b18 Why is “two-footed wingless animal” one and not two? Not because they are present in one genus, for (a) the genus does not share in the differentiae, else it would share in contraries at the same time, and for (b) if so then all the differentiae that belong to a genus will form a unity.
Burnyeat
Zeta 10-12 (Burnyeat)
Recall that in 1028b33 Aristotle promised a discussion of form, but where is the discussion of form? Bostock holds that Aristotle equates form and essence in the sense that Z4-11 constitutes both the discussion of form and the discussion of essence. Burnyeat maintains that discussion of the four independent topics, i.e. essence, genus, universal, and subject, are leading us to the conclusion that substantial being is form.
Burnyeat: Z10 was the first chapter to say that essence is form (Now in animals the soul…is the substance given by the formula, i.e. the form and what being is for bodies of this sort (1035b15-16); Now there are parts of the form, i.e. the what-being-is (1035b32)). The example used for the equation of form with essence at 1035b14-16 is the De Anima definition of soul.
The puzzle in Z11: which parts should be assigned to the form of something? Which to the composite whole? In explaining this, Aristotle committed himself to equating essence with form.
Z11 was the first to say explicitly that form is primary substantial being (1037a5). Contrast Categories, where the particular human or horse is called “primary substantial being” in relation to the quite different series: particular, species, and genus. With the announcement that form is substance, a conclusion is reached to the discussion of substance as essence.
The conclusion is Z11 is stronger than the conclusion in Z3 (that form and composite are substances more than matter is), for now form is explicitly prior to the composite.
Zeta 12
1. The recapitulation at the end of Z11 would lead smoothly into Z13
2. Just like Z7-9, Z12 is not recalled in the summary of H1.
3. But it is not so clear that the insertion was due to Aristotle himself, but probably a later editor.
The puzzle: why is two-footed terrestrial animal one thing, not many? Burnyeat proposes that Aristotle means it is not a question for logic at all, but for a more scientific level of discourse.
In Z12 definition by division is only the first type of definition Aristotle proposes to discuss. Posterior Analytics II6 would suggest as a second type of definitions deduced from a hypothesis.
Bostock
Z11
Ross: What parts are parts of the form? Which parts are parts of the concrete composite?
Bostock: It looks like asking the same question as Z1. Bostock suggests that the concern has actually shifted to the universal compounds (man and horse).
The form of man is always found in the flesh, bone, etc. Are these, i.e. flesh and bone, (a) parts of the form, or (b) parts of the matter, which cannot be separated from the form because the form never supervenes on other materials?
