Metaphysics Z.7-9

My observations. 1. How is an artistic production, such as a healthy person, produced? How does an unhealthy person become healthy?

In Zeta 7 Aristotle mentions that the artistic production presupposes the presence of the form of the product in the soul of the artist. But in the case of becoming healthy person, unlike the production of a house (Zeta 9), needs not an external mover. So it seems that the person who undergoes the becoming from unhealthy to healthy is the artist, where resides the presence of the form of health. (1032b4-11) Yet Ross construes the artist as the physician. According to Zeta 7, health is produced (a) by thinking of the conditions of health and (b) when the thought is complete, the making (i.e. the process toward health) begins. So, does it mean that the unhealthy person himself can become healthy simply by thinking of the conditions of health? Simply thinking of the conditions of health can trigger off the becoming of a healthy person?

Metaphysics Z.7-9

Study Notes of Ross’ commentaries. Z7: How is a natural thing, such as a man, produced?
Natural becoming: the “from which” is matter, which is capable both of being or not being.

How is an artistic production, such as a healthy man, produced?
Artistic becoming: the artistic production presupposes the presence of the form of the product in the soul of the artist. Health is produced (a) by thinking of the conditions of health and (b) when the thought is complete, the making (i.e. the process toward health) begins. The genesis has two stages, thinking and making.

Metaphysics Z.6

My observations. 1031a15-18
(1) Each thing = its substance
(2) Each substance = its essence
(3) Therefore, each thing = its essence

Here are my four questions for Zeta 6:
#1 about the reduction ad absurdum argument at 1031a21-28
#2 about the identity of substance with essence at 1031b3-6 and 1031b33-1032a3
#3 about the forms (eide) at 1031b14-15
#4 about the question whether Socrates and to be Socrates are the same thing at 1032a4-11

Metaphysics Z.4

My observations. 1. Regarding 1029b13 "kai proton eipomen enia peri autou logikos." Here I have a comment rather than question about Burnyeat's interpretation.

Ross: logikos suggests plausibility rather than truth, a reference to abstract considerations (logoi) rather than to the precise nature of the facts in question.

Bostock: three accounts about logikos (a) often means definition, it would be quite nature to suppose that Aristotle is proposing to begin by defining his notion of essence. (b)"Logical remarks" concern language, or "how to express oneself." (c) In contrast with "physical remarks," one remains general and abstract, whereas the other goes deeply into the nature of the objects concerned.

Metaphysics Z.4

Study Notes of Bostock's and Burnyeat's. Z4-Z5 Main concern: What can be said to have a definition? Answer: Only species, i.e. forms, in the category of substance will qualify.

Z4-Z5 Aristotle argues that only a substance has an essence. But in Z6 he argues that a substance in fact is the essence that it has.

Bostock’s translation
(i) what being is for a thing (the what it was for a thing to be); a what-being-is (the what it was to be)
(ii) what a thing is; a what it is
(iii) a this
(iv) an underlying thing