Metaphysics Z.13

Study Notes. How are we to reconcile the claim that no universal is substance and the claim that an essence is a substance? For surely essences are universals?

(a) If forms are to be understood in the usual way, i.e. as universals, then in order to maintain their claim to be substances we must apparently say that Z13 does not really mean to argue that no universal is a substance. But this interpretation conflicts with what our text actually says, such as “nothing predicated universally is a substance…”

(b) An Alternative version of this line of interpretation holds that Aristotle is attaching an unexpected sense to the word “universal”. The idea is that he still conceives of essences as in our sense universal, but they are no longer to be counted as universal in his sense, for in his sense, “universal” now means “more universal than is the indivisible species-form”. One objection can be noted: This interpretation certainly posits a change in Aristotle’s use of the word “universal”. Yet Aristotle does not appear to intend any such change.

2. Bostock’s conjecture: there was an earlier version of Z13 in which the species-form was counted as a substance, and a later version in which it was not. The crucial part of the conjecture is that (2) part of the earlier version and was not intended to be part of the later version at all, whereas the later version contained (1), (3), (4), (5).

(a) Earlier version: so long as the universal species-form is still allowed as a substance, the claim that anything more universal than this is not a substance fits well enough with Aristotle’s doctrine elsewhere.

(b) Whether this version is taken as implying that only particular men, horses, trees, and so on, could be substances, or whether it is taken as implying that only their particular forms could be substances, in either case it is clearly not consistent with the main thrust of Z4-11. It is also contradicted by the opening o fZ15, which implies that both universal forms and concrete particulars are substances.

But why should Aristotle have wished to destroy his earlier discussion in this way? Had he come to believe in particular forms? Could it…?

Metaphysics Z.10-12

My observations. 1. What exactly is the problem of the unity of a definition? (1037b8-14)

Ross: "what constitutes the unity of a subject of a definition?"
Bostock: "what is it that holds these parts together, so as to make them parts of some one thing?"
Burnyeat: "Why is two-footed animal one thing, not many?"
Marc Cohen: "Definitions are complex (a definition is always some combination of terms), so what accounts for the definiendum being one thing, rather then many?

Metaphysics Z.10-12

Study Notes of Ross, Burnyeat, Bostock. Ross: Zeta 10: (1) Should the definition of a whole contain the definition of the parts? (2) What parts are prior to the whole?

Question: “Prior” in what sense?
The wholes are prior to the parts both in definition and in power of independent existence.

Metaphysics Z.7-9

My observations. 1. How is an artistic production, such as a healthy person, produced? How does an unhealthy person become healthy?

In Zeta 7 Aristotle mentions that the artistic production presupposes the presence of the form of the product in the soul of the artist. But in the case of becoming healthy person, unlike the production of a house (Zeta 9), needs not an external mover. So it seems that the person who undergoes the becoming from unhealthy to healthy is the artist, where resides the presence of the form of health. (1032b4-11) Yet Ross construes the artist as the physician. According to Zeta 7, health is produced (a) by thinking of the conditions of health and (b) when the thought is complete, the making (i.e. the process toward health) begins. So, does it mean that the unhealthy person himself can become healthy simply by thinking of the conditions of health? Simply thinking of the conditions of health can trigger off the becoming of a healthy person?

Metaphysics Z.7-9

Study Notes of Ross’ commentaries. Z7: How is a natural thing, such as a man, produced?
Natural becoming: the “from which” is matter, which is capable both of being or not being.

How is an artistic production, such as a healthy man, produced?
Artistic becoming: the artistic production presupposes the presence of the form of the product in the soul of the artist. Health is produced (a) by thinking of the conditions of health and (b) when the thought is complete, the making (i.e. the process toward health) begins. The genesis has two stages, thinking and making.

Metaphysics Z.6

My observations. 1031a15-18
(1) Each thing = its substance
(2) Each substance = its essence
(3) Therefore, each thing = its essence

Here are my four questions for Zeta 6:
#1 about the reduction ad absurdum argument at 1031a21-28
#2 about the identity of substance with essence at 1031b3-6 and 1031b33-1032a3
#3 about the forms (eide) at 1031b14-15
#4 about the question whether Socrates and to be Socrates are the same thing at 1032a4-11

Metaphysics Z.4

My observations. 1. Regarding 1029b13 "kai proton eipomen enia peri autou logikos." Here I have a comment rather than question about Burnyeat's interpretation.

Ross: logikos suggests plausibility rather than truth, a reference to abstract considerations (logoi) rather than to the precise nature of the facts in question.

Bostock: three accounts about logikos (a) often means definition, it would be quite nature to suppose that Aristotle is proposing to begin by defining his notion of essence. (b)"Logical remarks" concern language, or "how to express oneself." (c) In contrast with "physical remarks," one remains general and abstract, whereas the other goes deeply into the nature of the objects concerned.

Metaphysics Z.4

Study Notes of Bostock's and Burnyeat's. Z4-Z5 Main concern: What can be said to have a definition? Answer: Only species, i.e. forms, in the category of substance will qualify.

Z4-Z5 Aristotle argues that only a substance has an essence. But in Z6 he argues that a substance in fact is the essence that it has.

Bostock’s translation
(i) what being is for a thing (the what it was for a thing to be); a what-being-is (the what it was to be)
(ii) what a thing is; a what it is
(iii) a this
(iv) an underlying thing

Metaphysics Z.1-3

My observations. 1. 1028a10 We speak of X in many ways. Does X refer to "the thing" what it is or "the phrase "what it is? One implies that Aristotle is giving us an ontological scheme of what it is, and the other a linguistic scheme. It seems to me that Bostock is committed to the latter.

2. 1028a20-31 What underlies walking? Primary substance? Or secondary substance? It seems that we have three entities here: walking, the walking thing, and the man. Some hold that the walking thing is the same as the man and they both underlie walking, others hold that the walking thing underlies walking and the man underlies the walking thing. Bostock suggests that particular walking thing underlies particular walking and universal substance (i.e. secondary substances) underlies universal walking. It seems to me a little bit odd.

Metaphysics Z.1-3

Study Notes of Bostock's Metaphysics Z1-3. Z1: The primary issue of Z1: is Aristotle thinking of primary substance, or of secondary substances, or being the substance of something (in particular, the substance of a primary substance)? The very first chapter of book Z is a notorious example of this problem. (44)

Issue: “We speak of X in many ways.”
Account #1 There is a single thing, X, for which we may have many words. (Ross)
Account #2 There is a single word, X, which does not mean any one thing. So here Aristotle’s claim is that the word “is” or the phrase “what is” has several meanings.
(Bostock) (45)