My observations. 1. 1028a10 We speak of X in many ways. Does X refer to "the thing" what it is or "the phrase "what it is? One implies that Aristotle is giving us an ontological scheme of what it is, and the other a linguistic scheme. It seems to me that Bostock is committed to the latter.
2. 1028a20-31 What underlies walking? Primary substance? Or secondary substance? It seems that we have three entities here: walking, the walking thing, and the man. Some hold that the walking thing is the same as the man and they both underlie walking, others hold that the walking thing underlies walking and the man underlies the walking thing. Bostock suggests that particular walking thing underlies particular walking and universal substance (i.e. secondary substances) underlies universal walking. It seems to me a little bit odd.
3. 1028a33-34 Aristotle mentions no other predicate is separable, but only substance. I am curious about what exactly is separable. Is he talking of primary substance or secondary substance? (Related to question 8)
4. 1028b3 Does "always" imply a pessimistic prediction that no one will ever reach a satisfactory answer to what is being? Professor Hankinson once mentioned that he doubts there exists a unified account for what it is in the Metaphysics. I am just curious about what you think.
5. 1028b33 Where is the discussion of form? Bostock holds that Aristotle equates form and essence, so Z4-11 (4-6 & 10-11 about essence, and 7-9 a digression for coming to be) constitutes both the discussion of form and the discussion of essence. Burnyeat seems to hold that discussion of the four independent topics, i.e. essence, genus, universal, and subject, are leading us to the conclusion that substantial being is form. So the whole Zeta seems to discuss the form. I find Burnyeat's interpretation a little bit odd. Is it the answer for the question "what substance is"?
6. 1028b36 What underlies is that it is a subject of predicate and never a predicate. Here Aristotle seems to claim an ultimate subject (i.e. cannot be further analyzable), just as he does in the Categories (2a11-14 where Aristotle says the ultimate subject is primary substance). My question is: is this ultimate subject still made of form in matter (and thus can be further analyzed)? So perhaps the ultimate subject in the Metaphysic is not primary substance, but something more basic, like the form or the compound?
7. 1029a23 How is it possible for a subtance being predicated of matter? For example, this matter is Socrates. The standard account holds that by substance Aristotle means form. But Bostock proposes that the "is" of "this matter is Socrates" is different from our ordinary "is" of predication and of identity, since it is not followed by a general term, nor is it of identity. Bostock calls it the "is" of constitution.
8. 1029a28 Aristotle proposes two criteria for substance: separable and thisness. What does he mean by being separable? what does he mean by thisness?
