Metaphysics Z.7-9

My observations. 1. How is an artistic production, such as a healthy person, produced? How does an unhealthy person become healthy?

In Zeta 7 Aristotle mentions that the artistic production presupposes the presence of the form of the product in the soul of the artist. But in the case of becoming healthy person, unlike the production of a house (Zeta 9), needs not an external mover. So it seems that the person who undergoes the becoming from unhealthy to healthy is the artist, where resides the presence of the form of health. (1032b4-11) Yet Ross construes the artist as the physician. According to Zeta 7, health is produced (a) by thinking of the conditions of health and (b) when the thought is complete, the making (i.e. the process toward health) begins. So, does it mean that the unhealthy person himself can become healthy simply by thinking of the conditions of health? Simply thinking of the conditions of health can trigger off the becoming of a healthy person?

Metaphysics Z.7-9

Study Notes of Ross’ commentaries. Z7: How is a natural thing, such as a man, produced?
Natural becoming: the “from which” is matter, which is capable both of being or not being.

How is an artistic production, such as a healthy man, produced?
Artistic becoming: the artistic production presupposes the presence of the form of the product in the soul of the artist. Health is produced (a) by thinking of the conditions of health and (b) when the thought is complete, the making (i.e. the process toward health) begins. The genesis has two stages, thinking and making.

Metaphysics Z.6

My observations. 1031a15-18
(1) Each thing = its substance
(2) Each substance = its essence
(3) Therefore, each thing = its essence

Here are my four questions for Zeta 6:
#1 about the reduction ad absurdum argument at 1031a21-28
#2 about the identity of substance with essence at 1031b3-6 and 1031b33-1032a3
#3 about the forms (eide) at 1031b14-15
#4 about the question whether Socrates and to be Socrates are the same thing at 1032a4-11

Metaphysics Z.4

My observations. 1. Regarding 1029b13 "kai proton eipomen enia peri autou logikos." Here I have a comment rather than question about Burnyeat's interpretation.

Ross: logikos suggests plausibility rather than truth, a reference to abstract considerations (logoi) rather than to the precise nature of the facts in question.

Bostock: three accounts about logikos (a) often means definition, it would be quite nature to suppose that Aristotle is proposing to begin by defining his notion of essence. (b)"Logical remarks" concern language, or "how to express oneself." (c) In contrast with "physical remarks," one remains general and abstract, whereas the other goes deeply into the nature of the objects concerned.

Metaphysics Z.4

Study Notes of Bostock's and Burnyeat's. Z4-Z5 Main concern: What can be said to have a definition? Answer: Only species, i.e. forms, in the category of substance will qualify.

Z4-Z5 Aristotle argues that only a substance has an essence. But in Z6 he argues that a substance in fact is the essence that it has.

Bostock’s translation
(i) what being is for a thing (the what it was for a thing to be); a what-being-is (the what it was to be)
(ii) what a thing is; a what it is
(iii) a this
(iv) an underlying thing

Metaphysics Z.1-3

My observations. 1. 1028a10 We speak of X in many ways. Does X refer to "the thing" what it is or "the phrase "what it is? One implies that Aristotle is giving us an ontological scheme of what it is, and the other a linguistic scheme. It seems to me that Bostock is committed to the latter.

2. 1028a20-31 What underlies walking? Primary substance? Or secondary substance? It seems that we have three entities here: walking, the walking thing, and the man. Some hold that the walking thing is the same as the man and they both underlie walking, others hold that the walking thing underlies walking and the man underlies the walking thing. Bostock suggests that particular walking thing underlies particular walking and universal substance (i.e. secondary substances) underlies universal walking. It seems to me a little bit odd.

Metaphysics Z.1-3

Study Notes of Bostock's Metaphysics Z1-3. Z1: The primary issue of Z1: is Aristotle thinking of primary substance, or of secondary substances, or being the substance of something (in particular, the substance of a primary substance)? The very first chapter of book Z is a notorious example of this problem. (44)

Issue: “We speak of X in many ways.”
Account #1 There is a single thing, X, for which we may have many words. (Ross)
Account #2 There is a single word, X, which does not mean any one thing. So here Aristotle’s claim is that the word “is” or the phrase “what is” has several meanings.
(Bostock) (45)

Aeneid, the End of Bk II

My favorite passages of Aeneid - Aeneas mourns for the loss of Creusa (Bk II. 735-744, 768-794) (which happened to be my sight translation passages in the final exam of Aeneid).

Hic mihi nescio quod trepido male numen amicum
confusam eripuit mentem. Namque avia cursu
dum sequor, et nota excedo regione viarum,
heu, misero coniunx fatone erepta Creüsa
substitit, erravitne via, seu lassa resedit,
incertum; nec post oculis est reddita nostris.
Nec prius amissam respexi animumque reflexi,
quam tumulum antiquae Cereris sedemque sacratam
venimus; hic demum collectis omnibus una
defuit, et comites natumque virumque fefellit.
(Aenied II. 735-744)

Aeneid IV

At regina gravi iamdudum saucia cura
volnus alit venis, et caeco carpitur igni.
Multa viri virtus animo, multusque recursat
gentis honos: haerent infixi pectore voltus
verbaque, nec placidam membris dat cura quietem.
Postera Phoebea lustrabat lampade terras,
umentemque Aurora polo dimoverat umbram,
cum sic unanimam adloquitur male sana sororem:
“Anna soror, quae me suspensam insomnia terrent!
Quis novus hic nostris successit sedibus hospes,
quem sese ore ferens, quam forti pectore et armis!

Respublica X

My favorite passages of Plato's Republic
κατὰ τύχην δὲ τὴν Ὀδυσσέως λαχοῦσαν πασῶν ὑστάτην αἱρησομένην ἰέναι, μνήμῃ δὲ τῶν προτέρων πόνων φιλοτιμίας λελωφηκυῖαν ζητεῖν περιιοῦσαν χρόνον πολὺν βίον ἀνδρὸς ἰδιώτου ἀπράγμονος, καὶ μόγις εὑρεῖν κείμενόν που καὶ παρημελημένον ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ εἰπεῖν ἰδοῦσαν ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ ἂν ἔπραξεν καὶ πρώτη λαχοῦσα, καὶ ἁσμένην ἑλέσθαι. (Republic, 620c3-d2)