One of my favorite passages of Bacchae
ὃς δ’ ἦλθ’ ἔπειτ’, ἀντίπαλον ὁ Σεμέλης γόνος
βότρυος ὑγρὸν πῶμ’ ηὗρε κἀσηνέγκατο
θνητοῖς, ὃ παύει τοὺς ταλαιπώρους βροτοὺς
λύπης, ὅταν πλησθῶσιν ἀμπέλου ῥοῆς,
ὕπνον τε λήθην τῶν καθ’ ἡμέραν κακῶν
δίδωσιν, οὐδ’ ἔστ’ ἄλλο φάρμακον πόνων.
(Bacchae, 278-283)
March 7, 2008
January 18, 2008
April 23, 2007
Sophist 245e-255e
Main concerns:
I. What is the role of the Mark of Being in the Battle of Gods and Giants? Does it successfully reconcile the Gods with the Giants? Is the discussion of the Mark of Being offered as a new approach to Plato’s theory of Forms?
II. (i) Why does Plato turn to discuss the Great Kinds after considering the Mark of Being? How does the discussion of the Great Kinds relate to that of the Mark of Being? Does the discussion of the Great Kinds deviate from Plato’s theory of Forms?
(ii) What is the function of the Great Kinds? How do they associate with each other? Is the combination among the Great Kinds an asymmetrical one? Are they associated with each other in the same way as a particular partakes of some Form?
I. What is the role of the Mark of Being in the Battle of Gods and Giants? Does it successfully reconcile the Gods with the Giants? Is the discussion of the Mark of Being offered as a new approach to Plato’s theory of Forms?
II. (i) Why does Plato turn to discuss the Great Kinds after considering the Mark of Being? How does the discussion of the Great Kinds relate to that of the Mark of Being? Does the discussion of the Great Kinds deviate from Plato’s theory of Forms?
(ii) What is the function of the Great Kinds? How do they associate with each other? Is the combination among the Great Kinds an asymmetrical one? Are they associated with each other in the same way as a particular partakes of some Form?
January 29, 2007
Vlastos on Reasons and Causes
Why is x F?
εἶναί τι ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τούτων τἆλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχειν (Phaedo, 102a10-b2)
Each of the Forms exists and other things acquired their name by having a share in them.
The 1st part of this statement (claiming the safe but uninformative αἰτία):
∀F∀x∃ϕ (Fx ↔ x participates ϕ)
ϕ: Form, x: individual, F: immanent character designated by adjective or abstract noun.
The 2nd part of this statement (claiming the clever αἰτία):
Instead of mentioning just one Form, ϕ, Socrates now refers us also to another, Γ, so related to ϕ, that whatever is “named after” Γ, will also be name after ϕ (103e-104b). X is F because it participates in Γ and Γ entails ϕ.
εἶναί τι ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τούτων τἆλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχειν (Phaedo, 102a10-b2)
Each of the Forms exists and other things acquired their name by having a share in them.
The 1st part of this statement (claiming the safe but uninformative αἰτία):
∀F∀x∃ϕ (Fx ↔ x participates ϕ)
ϕ: Form, x: individual, F: immanent character designated by adjective or abstract noun.
The 2nd part of this statement (claiming the clever αἰτία):
Instead of mentioning just one Form, ϕ, Socrates now refers us also to another, Γ, so related to ϕ, that whatever is “named after” Γ, will also be name after ϕ (103e-104b). X is F because it participates in Γ and Γ entails ϕ.
January 15, 2007
Phaedo 100b-102e
Isn't Simmias shorter than Phaedo and taller than Socrates "by a head"? Why does Plato insist that "a head" cannot serve as a proper explanation of the above phenomena?
November 27, 2006
Qualifying Exams
I spent a whole year of 2006 in preparing for the two qualifying exams: Ancient Greek translation exam on July 6th, 2006, and Ancient Greek philosophy comprehensive exam on November 27th, 2006. In memory of these days.
April 30, 2006
Being Tough Enough?
Τί οὖν; νῦν οὐ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἡμῖν φαίνεται ἐργαζομένη, ἡγεμονεύουσά τε ἐκείνων πάντων ἐξ ὧν φησί τις αὐτὴν εἶναι, καὶ ἐναντιουμένη ὀλίγου πάντα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου καὶ δεσπόζουσα πάντας τρόπους, τὰ μὲν χαλεπώτερον κολάζουσα καὶ μετ’ ἀλγηδόνων, τά τε κατὰ τὴν γυμναστικὴν καὶ τὴν ἰατρικήν, τὰ δὲ πρᾳότερον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀπειλοῦσα, τὰ δὲ νουθετοῦσα, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὀργαῖς καὶ φόβοις ὡς ἄλλη οὖσα ἄλλῳ πράγματι διαλεγομένη; οἷόν που καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐν Ὀδυσσείᾳ πεποίηκεν, οὗ λέγει τὸν Ὀδυσσέα· στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ· (Phaedo, 94c9-d7)
November 27, 2005
Metaphysics Z.17
My observations. Question #1. Regarding 1041a27-32, where Aristotle proposes to explore the question “what is x” from a new angle “why is x y.” From this, i.e., a why-question asks why one thing belongs to another, Aristotle infers that “what is sought is the cause.” The text then adds “and this is, to speak logically, the essence” (touto d’ esti to ti en einai, hos eipein logikos) (1041a28). Jaeger brackets the sentence and explains “verba ut spuria del. Al.” (i.e. Alexander deletes the words as spurious).
November 20, 2005
Metaphysics Z.14-16
My observations. In Zeta 16 Aristotle argues that (a) a substance must be one (1040b5-16) and (b) yet one cannot be the substance of a thing (1040b16-27). Here I have four sets of questions/observations:
(1) the association of potentiality and matter (1040b5-8),
(2) the problem of the unity of natural kinds/elemental stuff (1040b8-10),
(3) the relation of unity and being (1040b16-27), and
(4) Aristotle's criticism on the one over many (1040b27-1041a3).
(1) the association of potentiality and matter (1040b5-8),
(2) the problem of the unity of natural kinds/elemental stuff (1040b8-10),
(3) the relation of unity and being (1040b16-27), and
(4) Aristotle's criticism on the one over many (1040b27-1041a3).
Metaphysics Z.14-16
Study Notes of Metaphysics Z14-16. Z14: The Platonic conception of forms was associated with the claim that universals are substances.
(1) If “animal” is supposed the same in horse and in man, (a) how can it be the same in things that exist apart? (b) If it shares in “two-footed” and in “many-footed,” it will have contrary attributes; if it does not, in what sense can it be two-footed?
(2) If “animal” is different in each species, (a) there will be practically an infinity of things whose substance is “animal.” (b) Each of several things will be “animal itself.” (c) From what will the “animal” in each species be derived?
(3) These and even greater difficulties arise if we consider the relation of Forms to sensible things.
(1) If “animal” is supposed the same in horse and in man, (a) how can it be the same in things that exist apart? (b) If it shares in “two-footed” and in “many-footed,” it will have contrary attributes; if it does not, in what sense can it be two-footed?
(2) If “animal” is different in each species, (a) there will be practically an infinity of things whose substance is “animal.” (b) Each of several things will be “animal itself.” (c) From what will the “animal” in each species be derived?
(3) These and even greater difficulties arise if we consider the relation of Forms to sensible things.