Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων λέγωμεν κοινῇ περὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως. ἡ δ’ αἴσθησις ἐν τῷ κινεῖσθαί τε καὶ πάσχειν συμβαίνει, καθάπερ εἴρηται• δοκεῖ γὰρ ἀλλοίωσίς τις εἶναι. φασὶ δέ τινες καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου πάσχειν. τοῦτο δὲ πῶς δυνατὸν ἢ ἀδύνατον, εἰρήκαμεν ἐν τοῖς καθόλου λόγοις περὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν. (416b32-417a2)
πάσης b32: every? the whole (Hamlyn)?
ἀλλοίωσίς τις b34: a kind of qualitative change
τινες b35: refer to Democritus and Empedocles (De Anima I.5)
εἰρήκαμεν a1: Phys. III.1-3, De Gen. et Corr. I.7
ἔχει δ’ ἀπορίαν διὰ τί καὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων αὐτῶν οὐ γίνεται αἴσθησις, καὶ διὰ τί ἄνευ τῶν ἔξω οὐ ποιοῦσιν αἴσθησιν, ἐνόντος πυρὸς καὶ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων στοιχείων, ὧν ἐστιν ἡ αἴσθησις καθ’ αὑτὰ ἢ τὰ συμβεβηκότα τούτοις. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὸ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνεργείᾳ, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει μόνον, διὸ οὐκ αἰσθάνεται, καθάπερ τὸ καυστὸν οὐ καίεται αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ ἄνευ τοῦ καυστικοῦ• ἔκαιε γὰρ ἂν ἑαυτό, καὶ οὐθὲν ἐδεῖτο τοῦ ἐντελεχείᾳ πυρὸς ὄντος.
(417a2-417a9)
τῶν αἰσθήσεων and αἴσθησις a2: sense organs and perception ἡ αἴσθησις καθ’ αὑτὰ ἢ τὰ συμβεβηκότα a5-6? Does Aristotle mean that perception is of the elements per se or in respect of their attributes? Ross: τὰ συμβεβηκότα is not to be limited to accidental elements: it includes also the essential attributes of the elements (heat or cold, dryness or fluidity.cf. 423b27029)
Does Aristotle answer the question why the sense organs do not perceive themselves?
ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι λέγομεν διχῶς (τό τε γὰρ δυνάμει ἀκοῦον καὶ ὁρῶν ἀκούειν καὶ ὁρᾶν λέγομεν, κἂν τύχῃ καθεῦδον, καὶ τὸ ἤδη ἐνεργοῦν), διχῶς ἂν λέγοιτο καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις, ἡ μὲν ὡς δυνάμει, ἡ δὲ ὡς ἐνεργείᾳ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν, τό τε δυνάμει ὂν καὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ. (417a9-417a14)
διχῶς a10: the first actuality and the second actuality
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὡς τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄντος τοῦ πάσχειν καὶ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι καὶ τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν λέγωμεν• καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν ἡ κίνησις ἐνέργειά τις, ἀτελὴς μέντοι, καθάπερ ἐν ἑτέροις εἴρηται. πάντα δὲ πάσχει καὶ κινεῖται ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντος. διὸ ἔστι μὲν ὡς ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου πάσχει, ἔστι δὲ ὡς ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀνομοίου, καθάπερ εἴπομεν• πάσχει μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀνόμοιον, πεπονθὸς δ’ ὅμοιόν ἐστιν. (417a14-417a20)
τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν a15: the actuality of the sense organ? The first actuality or the second actuality?
τοῦ αὐτοῦ a15: in what sense?
καθάπερ ἐν ἑτέροις εἴρηται a17: Phys. III.2
Perception as a Process of Becoming Like (a18-20): answers the earlier question whether the like is affected by like (416b35).
The change in the eye when perceiving a red object:
1. Literalists: the eye jelly is altered so that it literally becomes like its object – the eye jelly becomes red. (Sorabji, Everson)
Everson: the capacity cannot be actualized unless there is also a material change which determines that activity.
2. Spiritualists: the change is a cognitive change: when a red object acts on the eye, the only result is that the eye’s capacity for vision is exercised (i.e. energeia). It is a becoming aware of some sensible quality. (Aquinas, Burnyeat)
Burnyeat: Perceiving activity as an energeia: a special kind of qualitative change (2002). There is no substantial distinction between kinêsis (the first actuality) and energeia (the second actuality) (2008).
