Main concerns:
I. What is the role of the Mark of Being in the Battle of Gods and Giants? Does it successfully reconcile the Gods with the Giants? Is the discussion of the Mark of Being offered as a new approach to Plato’s theory of Forms?
II. (i) Why does Plato turn to discuss the Great Kinds after considering the Mark of Being? How does the discussion of the Great Kinds relate to that of the Mark of Being? Does the discussion of the Great Kinds deviate from Plato’s theory of Forms?
(ii) What is the function of the Great Kinds? How do they associate with each other? Is the combination among the Great Kinds an asymmetrical one? Are they associated with each other in the same way as a particular partakes of some Form?
April 23, 2007
January 29, 2007
Vlastos on Reasons and Causes
Why is x F?
εἶναί τι ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τούτων τἆλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχειν (Phaedo, 102a10-b2)
Each of the Forms exists and other things acquired their name by having a share in them.
The 1st part of this statement (claiming the safe but uninformative αἰτία):
∀F∀x∃ϕ (Fx ↔ x participates ϕ)
ϕ: Form, x: individual, F: immanent character designated by adjective or abstract noun.
The 2nd part of this statement (claiming the clever αἰτία):
Instead of mentioning just one Form, ϕ, Socrates now refers us also to another, Γ, so related to ϕ, that whatever is “named after” Γ, will also be name after ϕ (103e-104b). X is F because it participates in Γ and Γ entails ϕ.
εἶναί τι ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τούτων τἆλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχειν (Phaedo, 102a10-b2)
Each of the Forms exists and other things acquired their name by having a share in them.
The 1st part of this statement (claiming the safe but uninformative αἰτία):
∀F∀x∃ϕ (Fx ↔ x participates ϕ)
ϕ: Form, x: individual, F: immanent character designated by adjective or abstract noun.
The 2nd part of this statement (claiming the clever αἰτία):
Instead of mentioning just one Form, ϕ, Socrates now refers us also to another, Γ, so related to ϕ, that whatever is “named after” Γ, will also be name after ϕ (103e-104b). X is F because it participates in Γ and Γ entails ϕ.
January 15, 2007
Phaedo 100b-102e
Isn't Simmias shorter than Phaedo and taller than Socrates "by a head"? Why does Plato insist that "a head" cannot serve as a proper explanation of the above phenomena?
November 27, 2006
Qualifying Exams
I spent a whole year of 2006 in preparing for the two qualifying exams: Ancient Greek translation exam on July 6th, 2006, and Ancient Greek philosophy comprehensive exam on November 27th, 2006. In memory of these days.
April 30, 2006
Being Tough Enough?
Τί οὖν; νῦν οὐ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἡμῖν φαίνεται ἐργαζομένη, ἡγεμονεύουσά τε ἐκείνων πάντων ἐξ ὧν φησί τις αὐτὴν εἶναι, καὶ ἐναντιουμένη ὀλίγου πάντα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου καὶ δεσπόζουσα πάντας τρόπους, τὰ μὲν χαλεπώτερον κολάζουσα καὶ μετ’ ἀλγηδόνων, τά τε κατὰ τὴν γυμναστικὴν καὶ τὴν ἰατρικήν, τὰ δὲ πρᾳότερον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀπειλοῦσα, τὰ δὲ νουθετοῦσα, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὀργαῖς καὶ φόβοις ὡς ἄλλη οὖσα ἄλλῳ πράγματι διαλεγομένη; οἷόν που καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐν Ὀδυσσείᾳ πεποίηκεν, οὗ λέγει τὸν Ὀδυσσέα· στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ· (Phaedo, 94c9-d7)
November 27, 2005
Metaphysics Z.17
My observations. Question #1. Regarding 1041a27-32, where Aristotle proposes to explore the question “what is x” from a new angle “why is x y.” From this, i.e., a why-question asks why one thing belongs to another, Aristotle infers that “what is sought is the cause.” The text then adds “and this is, to speak logically, the essence” (touto d’ esti to ti en einai, hos eipein logikos) (1041a28). Jaeger brackets the sentence and explains “verba ut spuria del. Al.” (i.e. Alexander deletes the words as spurious).
November 20, 2005
Metaphysics Z.14-16
My observations. In Zeta 16 Aristotle argues that (a) a substance must be one (1040b5-16) and (b) yet one cannot be the substance of a thing (1040b16-27). Here I have four sets of questions/observations:
(1) the association of potentiality and matter (1040b5-8),
(2) the problem of the unity of natural kinds/elemental stuff (1040b8-10),
(3) the relation of unity and being (1040b16-27), and
(4) Aristotle's criticism on the one over many (1040b27-1041a3).
(1) the association of potentiality and matter (1040b5-8),
(2) the problem of the unity of natural kinds/elemental stuff (1040b8-10),
(3) the relation of unity and being (1040b16-27), and
(4) Aristotle's criticism on the one over many (1040b27-1041a3).
Metaphysics Z.14-16
Study Notes of Metaphysics Z14-16. Z14: The Platonic conception of forms was associated with the claim that universals are substances.
(1) If “animal” is supposed the same in horse and in man, (a) how can it be the same in things that exist apart? (b) If it shares in “two-footed” and in “many-footed,” it will have contrary attributes; if it does not, in what sense can it be two-footed?
(2) If “animal” is different in each species, (a) there will be practically an infinity of things whose substance is “animal.” (b) Each of several things will be “animal itself.” (c) From what will the “animal” in each species be derived?
(3) These and even greater difficulties arise if we consider the relation of Forms to sensible things.
(1) If “animal” is supposed the same in horse and in man, (a) how can it be the same in things that exist apart? (b) If it shares in “two-footed” and in “many-footed,” it will have contrary attributes; if it does not, in what sense can it be two-footed?
(2) If “animal” is different in each species, (a) there will be practically an infinity of things whose substance is “animal.” (b) Each of several things will be “animal itself.” (c) From what will the “animal” in each species be derived?
(3) These and even greater difficulties arise if we consider the relation of Forms to sensible things.
November 14, 2005
Metaphysics Z.13
Study Notes. How are we to reconcile the claim that no universal is substance and the claim that an essence is a substance? For surely essences are universals?
(a) If forms are to be understood in the usual way, i.e. as universals, then in order to maintain their claim to be substances we must apparently say that Z13 does not really mean to argue that no universal is a substance. But this interpretation conflicts with what our text actually says, such as “nothing predicated universally is a substance…”
(b) An Alternative version of this line of interpretation holds that Aristotle is attaching an unexpected sense to the word “universal”. The idea is that he still conceives of essences as in our sense universal, but they are no longer to be counted as universal in his sense, for in his sense, “universal” now means “more universal than is the indivisible species-form”. One objection can be noted: This interpretation certainly posits a change in Aristotle’s use of the word “universal”. Yet Aristotle does not appear to intend any such change.
2. Bostock’s conjecture: there was an earlier version of Z13 in which the species-form was counted as a substance, and a later version in which it was not. The crucial part of the conjecture is that (2) part of the earlier version and was not intended to be part of the later version at all, whereas the later version contained (1), (3), (4), (5).
(a) Earlier version: so long as the universal species-form is still allowed as a substance, the claim that anything more universal than this is not a substance fits well enough with Aristotle’s doctrine elsewhere.
(b) Whether this version is taken as implying that only particular men, horses, trees, and so on, could be substances, or whether it is taken as implying that only their particular forms could be substances, in either case it is clearly not consistent with the main thrust of Z4-11. It is also contradicted by the opening o fZ15, which implies that both universal forms and concrete particulars are substances.
But why should Aristotle have wished to destroy his earlier discussion in this way? Had he come to believe in particular forms? Could it…?
(a) If forms are to be understood in the usual way, i.e. as universals, then in order to maintain their claim to be substances we must apparently say that Z13 does not really mean to argue that no universal is a substance. But this interpretation conflicts with what our text actually says, such as “nothing predicated universally is a substance…”
(b) An Alternative version of this line of interpretation holds that Aristotle is attaching an unexpected sense to the word “universal”. The idea is that he still conceives of essences as in our sense universal, but they are no longer to be counted as universal in his sense, for in his sense, “universal” now means “more universal than is the indivisible species-form”. One objection can be noted: This interpretation certainly posits a change in Aristotle’s use of the word “universal”. Yet Aristotle does not appear to intend any such change.
2. Bostock’s conjecture: there was an earlier version of Z13 in which the species-form was counted as a substance, and a later version in which it was not. The crucial part of the conjecture is that (2) part of the earlier version and was not intended to be part of the later version at all, whereas the later version contained (1), (3), (4), (5).
(a) Earlier version: so long as the universal species-form is still allowed as a substance, the claim that anything more universal than this is not a substance fits well enough with Aristotle’s doctrine elsewhere.
(b) Whether this version is taken as implying that only particular men, horses, trees, and so on, could be substances, or whether it is taken as implying that only their particular forms could be substances, in either case it is clearly not consistent with the main thrust of Z4-11. It is also contradicted by the opening o fZ15, which implies that both universal forms and concrete particulars are substances.
But why should Aristotle have wished to destroy his earlier discussion in this way? Had he come to believe in particular forms? Could it…?
November 6, 2005
Metaphysics Z.10-12
My observations. 1. What exactly is the problem of the unity of a definition? (1037b8-14)
Ross: "what constitutes the unity of a subject of a definition?"
Bostock: "what is it that holds these parts together, so as to make them parts of some one thing?"
Burnyeat: "Why is two-footed animal one thing, not many?"
Marc Cohen: "Definitions are complex (a definition is always some combination of terms), so what accounts for the definiendum being one thing, rather then many?
Ross: "what constitutes the unity of a subject of a definition?"
Bostock: "what is it that holds these parts together, so as to make them parts of some one thing?"
Burnyeat: "Why is two-footed animal one thing, not many?"
Marc Cohen: "Definitions are complex (a definition is always some combination of terms), so what accounts for the definiendum being one thing, rather then many?